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Introduction
In September 2015, the Cabinet Secretary for Justice confirmed that the Scottish
Government planned to carry out a programme of jury research.1 This
announcement was the latest development in the lengthy law reform process that
started when Lord Carloway, in his review of the law post-Cadder,2 recommended
the abolition of the longstanding requirement for corroboration in Scottish criminal
cases.3 This led, in turn, to a second review—the Post-Corroboration Safeguards
Review (PCSR), undertaken by Lord Bonomy—of the safeguards against wrongful
conviction that might be necessary in the absence of a corroboration requirement.
The PCSR concluded, among other things, that there is insufficient knowledge of
how the Scottish criminal jury—which has 15 members, returns majority verdicts,
and has a choice between two different verdicts of acquittal (not guilty and not
proven)—operates and recommended that research into Scottish juries should be
undertaken to rectify this gap in knowledge.4
In this paper we briefly trace the developments that have led to the need for jury
research, before explaining why there is a need for such research specifically in
the Scottish context, with reference to the unique features of Scottish criminal
juries. We then consider the different methods that might be appropriate for
addressing the research questions posed by the PCSR and discuss whether
amendment of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, which prohibits enquiry into jury
deliberations in Scotland, would be necessary or desirable in this context. We
argue that the questions identified by the Review would best be addressed by
research with real jurors rather than with mock jurors, and that amendment of the
1981 Act would be required.
*We are grateful to Emma Ainsley for research assistance, and to the Leverhulme Trust for funding her work.
1 Scottish Parliament, Official Report: Justice Committee, 8 September 2015, col.16. Jury research “ahead of any
further proposals to reform the criminal justice system” was a manifesto commitment of the SNP prior to their victory
in the 2016 Holyrood elections: SNP,Manifesto 2016 (2016), p.39. At the time of writing, no decision on what form
the research would take had been announced.
2Cadder v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 43; [2010] 1 W.L.R. 2601; [2011] H.R.L.R. 1 led to the introduction of a
right to legal assistance for detained suspects in Scotland. It is discussed in more detail in the next section.
3The Carloway Review, Report and Recommendations (2011), p.286.
4The Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review, Final Report (2015), para.12.24.
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The road to jury research in Scotland
The road that has led to jury research is a long one. The starting point for the
current proposals was the decision in Cadder v HM Advocate5 that the use at trial
of admissions made by a suspect who had not been offered legal assistance would
be incompatible with art.6 of the ECHR.6 Prior to Cadder, Scots law did not
recognise a right to legal assistance during detention, but following the judgment
the Scottish Parliament passed emergency legislation that gave suspects this right
and made a number of other changes to Scottish criminal procedure.7 The
Government also commissioned Lord Carloway to review “the law and practice
of questioning suspects in a criminal investigation in Scotland”8 in the light of
Cadder and the ECHR jurisprudence. One of Lord Carloway’s (many)
recommendations was to abolish the longstanding requirement for corroboration
in criminal cases.9 TheGovernment accepted this recommendation10 but in response
to concerns that it might increase the risk of wrongful conviction11 commissioned
a second review, the Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review (PCSR),12 to consider
whether additional safeguards were needed.13 A number of possible safeguards
were included in the terms of reference, including jury majority and size.14 The
PCSR concluded that permitting simple majority verdicts was “untenable in a
post-corroboration system”15 and as an interim measure the required majority
should be increased to 10 from 15, pending research into “jury reasoning and
decision-making”.16
Following the PCSR, the Government announced that it would put on hold its
proposal to abolish the requirement for corroboration.17The corroboration provisions
in the Bill were removed and the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016, which
contains most of Lord Carloway’s other recommendations18 and also two of the
PCSR’s19 (alongside a number of other unrelated measures),20 received Royal
Assent on 13 January 2016.
At the time of writing, research into jury decision making and reasoning had
yet to be commissioned by the Government. One might wonder, though, why such
5Cadder [2010] UKSC 43; [2010] 1W.L.R. 2601; [2011] H.R.L.R. 1. See F. Leverick, “The Supreme Court Strikes
Back” (2011) 15 Edin. L.R. 287.
6Although it might be traced back further still to Salduz v Turkey (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 19; [2010] Crim. L.R. 419.
For a detailed account of the process that led to Cadder, see F. Leverick, “The Right to Legal Assistance During
Detention” (2011) 15 Edin. L.R. 352, 352–259.
7Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010. See F. Stark, “The
Consequences of Cadder” (2011) 15 Edin. L.R. 293.
8The Carloway Review, Report and Recommendations (2011), p.13
9The Carloway Review, Report and Recommendations (2011), p.286.
10 Scottish Government,Working for Scotland: The Government’s Programme for Scotland 2012–2013 (2012),
p.67.
11 See, e.g. J. Chalmers and F. Leverick, “Substantial and radical change: a new dawn for Scottish criminal
procedure?” (2012) 75 M.L.R. 837, 863–864.
12The Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review, Final Report (2015).
13Scottish Government,Reforming Scots Criminal Law and Practice: Additional Safeguards Following the Removal
of the Requirement for Corroboration (2012), para.2.1.
14The Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review, Final Report (2015), para.2.1.
15 the Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review, Final Report (2015), para.3.1..
16The Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review, Final Report (2015), para.12.24.
17Scottish Parliament,Official Report 21 April 2015, cols 11–12. No firm commitment on jury research was made
at this stage, with the Cabinet Secretary stating that he was “open minded on the issue”: col.17.
18 See ss.1–6, all of which relate to arrest.
19See s.57 (code of practice to be published for questioning and identification procedures); s.97 (prosecutorial test
to be published).
20 Such as police search powers (Pt 2) and sentencing for weapons offences (s.84).
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research is thought to be necessary. A huge volume of literature already exists on
jury decision making in a multitude of different contexts.21 The answer to that
question is that the conclusions drawn by this body of research are not easily
transferrable to the Scottish jury, which has a number of unique features, each of
which is discussed below.
The Scottish jury
In Scotland, cases can be prosecuted under solemn or summary procedure, but
only the former involves the use of a jury.22 Of 66,963 cases in the financial year
2015–16, 4,618 were prosecuted under solemn procedure but of these only 1,058
proceeded to a trial, the rest concluding with a guilty plea.23 As such, only 1.58
per cent of cases prosecuted in Scotland that year were determined by a jury. That
might lead to the conclusion that the jury is insignificant in Scottish criminal
procedure, but that would be unwarranted as the cases that the jury does determine
are those that potentially have the most serious consequences for the accused if
he or she is convicted.24
The Scottish jury is unusual in three respects.25 It comprises 15 members; it can
return a verdict of guilty by a simple majority (that is, eight votes); and the jury
has the option of two different verdicts of acquittal—not guilty and not proven.
The PCSR report suggested that
“the relationship among the various distinctive features of the Scottish jury
system is perhaps the most complicated to unravel when trying to determine
what additional safeguards may be required following the removal of the
requirement for corroboration”.26
Jury size
The size of the Scottish jury has received some attention before, with a 1975 review
recommending it be reduced to twelve,27 and a more recent consultation receiving
mixed responses on the question of whether its size might be reduced.28 While a
significant body of research on jury size exists in the US, this is largely in response
to case law on the question of the minimum jury size required to comply with the
21Two good overviews, although both are now a little dated, are P. Darbyshire, A. Maughan and A. Stewart,What
Can the English Legal System Learn from Jury Research Published up to 2001? (2002); D.J. Devine, L.D. Clayton,
B.B. Dunford, R.P. Seying and J. Pryce, “Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating
Groups” (2001) 7 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 622.
22 In Scotland the accused has no say in whether his or her case is heard by a jury: this decision is taken by the
procurator fiscal, except in respect of a very small number of offences (principally murder and rape) which can only
be prosecuted under solemn procedure. For discussion, see P. Duff, “The Defendant’s Right to Trial by Jury: A
Neighbour’s View” [2000] Crim. L.R. 85.
23Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, Case Processing Financial Year 2015/2016 (2016).
24The same point is made with reference to England and Wales by C. Thomas, Are Juries Fair? (2010), p.1. In
Scotland, cases prosecuted under solemn procedure can be heard in the sheriff court (maximum penalty: five years’
imprisonment) or the High Court (maximum penalty: life imprisonment): s.3 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland)
Act 1995. The maximum sentence in summary procedure is 12 months’ imprisonment: s.5(2).
25 See generally P. Duff, “The Scottish Criminal Jury: A Very Peculiar Institution” in N. Vidmar (ed.),World Jury
Systems (2000), p.250; J. Chalmers, “Jury Majority, Size and Verdicts” in J. Chalmers, F. Leverick and A. Shaw
(eds), Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review: Report of the Academic Expert Group (2014), p.140.
26The Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review, Final Report (2015), para.12.22.
27Criminal Procedure in Scotland (Second Report) (1975), Cmnd.6218, para.51.11.
28 See L. Nicholson, The Modern Scottish Jury in Criminal Trials: Analysis of Written Consultation Responses
(2009), p.30.
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Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, five jurors (unlike six) having been held to
be too few.29 That research has compared the six and the 12-member jury (and
occasionally other sizes smaller than 12), and suggests that smaller juries are
undesirable as being less likely to be properly representative of the community,
likely to deliberate for less time and less well, and likely to recall evidence less
accurately.30
This research, however, tells us nothing about whether a fifteen person jury has
advantages or disadvantages over one consisting of 12 members. There is reason
to be sceptical about the 15 person jury, given evidence about group
decision-making which emphasises the advantages of relatively small groups,31
and highlights the difficulties of achieving direct responsiveness betweenmembers
in groups of larger than about eight or 10.32 But this gives us reason only for doubt
and no more: the available research is concerned with very different contexts and
tells us nothing directly about juries.
The simple majority verdict
Aside from courts-martial,33 the Scottish system of simple majority verdicts appears
highly exceptional if not unique in the common lawworld. Although some systems
outside the common law world contemplate the possibility of verdict by simple
majority,34 they may counterbalance this by greater judicial supervision of the jury
(e.g. through permitting an appeal on the facts, judicial involvement in the jury’s
decision-making process, or allowing the trial judge or judges to overrule the jury
in certain cases), limiting the value of direct comparison. Most common law jury
systems take unanimity as the starting point for jury decision-making but—with
the principal exception of Canada35—allow juries to return a verdict despite the
dissent of one or sometimes two jurors. Various justifications have been offered
for permitting this, the best of which is probably that there may sometimes be “one
member of the group who is simply unreasonable or unwilling to properly take
into account the views of the others - the rogue juror”.36
The strongest objection to the Scottish rule is that it cannot readily be reconciled
with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption of
innocence, or the concept of the jury as a body which takes collective decisions.
Fears have occasionally been expressed about the number of hung juries that might
result from a change to the simple majority rule.37 There may, however, be little
29Ballew v Georgia 435 U.S. 223 (1978);Williams v Florida 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
30 See M.J. Saks and M.W. Marti, “A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Jury Size” (1997) 21 Law and Human
Behavior 451; V.P. Hans and N. Vidmar, Judging the Jury (New York: Plenum Press, 1986), Ch.11; A. Smith and
M.J. Saks, “The Case for Overturning Williams v Florida and the Six-Person Jury: History, Law and Empirical
Evidence” (2008) 60 Florida L.R. 441.
31 See A.B. Kao and I.D. Couzin, “Decision Accuracy in Complex Environments is Often Maximised by Small
Group Sizes” (2014) 281 Proceedings of the Royal Society B 2013305.
32 I.D. Steiner,Group Process and Productivity (New York: Academic Press, 1971), p.101. See also G.C. Homans,
The Human Group (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950), p.103.
33 See Twaite [2010] EWCA Crim 2973; [2011] 1 W.L.R. 1125; [2011] 1 Cr. App. R. 19 (p.249); Chalmers, “Jury
majority, size and verdicts” in Chalmers, Leverick and Shaw (eds), Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review: Report
of the Academic Expert Group (2014), pp.140, 143–145.
34 See E.J. Leib, “A Comparison of Criminal Jury Decision Rules in Democratic Countries” (2008) 5 Ohio State
J. of Criminal Law 629.
35 P. Sankoff, “Majority Jury Verdicts and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2006) 39 U.B.C. L.R. 333; Law
Reform Commission of Canada, The Jury in Criminal Trials (Working Paper No.27, 1980).
36New Zealand Law Reform Commission, Juries in Criminal Trials (Report 69, 2001), para.435.
37 See, e.g. Scottish Office, Juries and Verdicts (1994), para.6.5.
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difference in outcome between a jury systemwhich permits simplemajority verdicts
and one which requires near-unanimity, as data from England and Wales shows.
Thomas found, examining data from 2006–2008, that hung juries accounted for
0.6 per cent of all cases where juries deliberated and 0.08 per cent of all charges
in the Crown Court,38 and “in most cases these [were] juries that [had] reached
verdicts on at least some charges put to them”.39 If hung juries were to occur in
Scotland at the same rate as in England and Wales, the number of retrials which
would take place annually would be in single figures.40 This does not, however,
tell us anything about how the process of deliberation might be affected by the use
of a simple majority rule rather than one of unanimity.
The three verdict system
Scots law’s three-verdict system is largely a matter of historic accident, stemming
from a period where juries did not return general verdicts but instead found
particular facts proven or not proven.41 While the not proven verdict was retained
when juries returned to giving general verdicts, it has no distinct meaning or effect
compared to the not guilty verdict, and judges are discouraged even from attempting
to define it for juries.42 Its existence is sometimes linked to the corroboration
requirement, with the suggestion being made that it is appropriate where the
acquittal results only from a formal insufficiency of evidence.43However, a formal
insufficiency should result in the case being prevented from reaching the jury by
a no case to answer submission,44 and it is in any event unlikely that juries would
consistently adopt this technical rationale without specific direction to that effect.
A better explanation of the verdict’s effect may be that it reinforces the
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt by emphasising the possibility of
an acquittal in cases where jurors are in a state of marginal uncertainty.45 There is
some limited support for this in a single research paper, which appears to be the
only empirical study of the three verdict system.46 While that study suggested that
the not proven verdict might help to prevent wrongful convictions, because it
appeared particularly attractive to jurors in cases of “moderately strong” evidence,
it highlighted two potentially worrying aspects: first, 37 per cent of the mock jurors
who had considered a case on the basis of three verdicts believed that a not proven
verdict would permit the retrial of the accused at a later date, despite having
received written instructions to the contrary, and secondly, the researchers noted
38C. Thomas, Are Juries Fair? (2010), p.27.
39Thomas, Are Juries Fair? (2010), p.46.
40 See Chalmers, “Jury majority, size and verdicts” in Chalmers, Leverick and Shaw (eds), Post-Corroboration
Safeguards Review: Report of the Academic Expert Group (2014), pp.140, 152.
41 See G. Maher, “Jury Verdicts and the Presumption of Innocence” (1983) 3 L.S. 146, 148–149; I.D. Willock,
The Origins and Development of the Jury in Scotland (Edinburgh: Stair Society, 1966), pp.218–222.
42The standard direction is simply “There are three verdicts you can return, not guilty, or not proven, or guilty.
Not guilty and not proven have the same effect, acquittal. An accused acquitted of a charge can’t be prosecuted again
on it.” See Judicial Institute, Jury Manual: Some Notes for the Guidance of the Judiciary (January 2015), section
61.2.
43D. Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland, Respecting Crimes, 4th edn by B.R. Bell (Edinburgh: Bell and
Bradfute, 1844), Vol.ii, p.440; T.B. Smith, A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland (Edinburgh: W.Green, 1962),
p.227.
44 Introduced into Scots law by the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980 s.19. See now Criminal Procedure
(Scotland) Act 1995 ss.97 and 160.
45 See e.g.McNicol v HM Advocate 1964 J.C. 25 at 27; 1964 S.L.T. 151 at 152 (Lord Justice-General Clyde).
46L. Hope, E. Greene, A. Memon, M. Gavisk and K. Houston, “A Third Verdict Option: Exploring the Impact of
the Not Proven Verdict on Mock Juror Decision Making” (2008) 32 Law and Human Behavior 241.
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that deliberations appeared to “dry-up” once the possibility of a not proven verdict
was raised, suggesting that the verdict could inhibit thorough deliberation by jurors.
The research paper drew on data from two small-scale studies which involved
mock jurors reading trial summaries and either reaching individual decisions or
deliberating in groups of four to eight members. While it is the best evidence
available on the operation of the three verdict system, it raises questions for
consideration rather than providing a firm basis on which to draw conclusions
about how the three verdict system works in practice.
The difficulty, as Lord Bonomy expressed it in the PCSR report, was not simply
that each of these features of the Scottish jury was poorly understood, but that their
combined effect was equally obscure47:
“The unique features of Scottish juries … form important parts of a balanced
system which, until now, has included the corroboration requirement, a 15
person jury, 3 verdicts, and the possibility of conviction by simple majority.
Insufficient is known at this stage about the relationship among them, and in
particular about the use in practice of the Not Proven verdict, to enable any
firm evidence-based conclusion to be drawn about the likely impact of
reducing the size of the jury, changing from a system with three verdicts to
one with two, and requiring unanimous or near unanimous verdicts.”
In recommending that research into “jury reasoning and decision-making”48 should
therefore be undertaken, he suggested49:
“That research would include asking jurors at least the following:
• What jurors understand to be the difference between Not Guilty and
Not Proven [Q1]
• Why they choose one over the other [Q2]
• Why, and to what extent, do jurors alter their position as regards Not
Proven and Not Guilty as a result of deliberations [Q3]
• The extent to which the members of a jury of 15 (as compared with
a jury of 12) actually participate in deliberations [Q4]
• The differences in outcome (assuming an identical factual matrix)
as between a 12 person jury with only 2 possible verdicts and a 15
person jury with 3 verdicts, and the reasons for those differences
[Q5]; and
• Whether there are benefits in requiring the jury to attempt to reach
a unanimous verdict [Q6].”
“Other questions could possibly be added, includingwhether the samemajority
should be required for acquittal as for conviction [Q7], and whether the votes
for each verdict should be disclosed in court [Q8].”
47The Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review, Final Report (2015), para.12.22.
48The Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review, Final Report (2015), para.12.24.
49The Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review, Final Report (2015), para.12.25. The question numbers in square
brackets have been inserted for ease of reference later in this paper.
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Jury research methods and their application
How then might these questions be researched? In the field of jury research a wide
variety of research methods have been utilised. Some can immediately be
discounted in the present context. All of the questions raised by the PCSR relate
to understanding how juries reach decisions and the extent to which they
comprehend legal concepts. This could, in theory, be investigated by asking legal
professionals or others who have observed trials for their opinions about juror
decision making and understanding,50 but relying on an indirect method such as
this would be far inferior to undertaking research with actual or potential jurors
as participants.
This still leaves a number of different options in terms of the possible research
methods. A key distinction is between undertaking research with “real” jurors (i.e.
those who have sat on actual criminal trials) and “mock” jurors, and this distinction
is discussed in the next section.51
Research with real jurors
By research with real jurors, we mean jurors who have sat on real criminal trials
and participated in deliberations that have determined the fate of an accused person.
We exclude from this category research undertaken with jurors who have been
cited to court but not selected to sit on a trial. Such research is sometimes referred
to as research with real jurors (justifiably, given the use which it makes of existing
jury selection processes),52 but for the purposes of this article we have taken the
fact of participating in the determination of an accused’s person’s fate to be the
crucial dividing line between the two types of research, and we return to the
importance of this in the next section.
Research with real jurors as subjects is far less common than research with mock
jurors, especially in the UK jurisdictions where it is restricted by statute. In Scotland
the relevant provision is s.8(1) of the Contempt of Court Act,53 which provides
that
“it is a contempt of court to obtain, disclose or solicit any particulars of
statements made, opinions expressed, arguments advanced or votes cast by
50There is a body of research whereby jury verdicts or other aspects of jury behaviour are evaluated by legal
professionals: see, e.g. H. Kalven and H. Zeisel, The American Jury (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); M. Zander, “Are
TooMany Professional Criminals Avoiding Conviction? A Study of Britain’s Two Busiest Courts” (1974) 37 M.L.R.
28; J. Baldwin and M. McConville, Jury Trials (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). This has led to some interesting
findings, but it would not be the best way to address the PCSR questions.
51This does not tell the full story, as with either group of participants a number of different research methods could
be used, such as surveys, observation or controlled experiments. For a matrix setting out these different options and
some of the advantages and drawbacks of each, seeM.J. Saks, “What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries
(Should) Make Decisions?” (1997) 6 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 1.
52 See, e.g. Thomas, Are Juries Fair? (2010), p.45. Cf. M. Dann, V. Hans and D. Kaye, Testing the Effects of
Selected Jury Trial Innovations on Juror Comprehension of Contested mtDNA Evidence (2005), p.24.
53The provision also applies to Northern Ireland. In England and Wales, a review of the Contempt of Court Act
considered whether the prohibition on jury research should be lifted but concluded that it should not: see Contempt
of Court (1): Juror Misconduct and Internet Publications (2013), Law. Com. No.340, para.4.54. The relevant
prohibition in England andWales is now contained in s.20D of the Juries Act 1974 (as inserted by s.74 of the Criminal
Justice and Courts Act 2015), whichmakes it a criminal offence (rather than a contempt of court) subject to a maximum
penalty of two years imprisonment to disclose, solicit or obtain “information about statements made, opinions
expressed, arguments advanced or votes cast by members of a jury in the course of their deliberations in proceedings
before a court”. There are a number of exceptions set out in ss.20E–20G, but none covers academic research.
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members of a jury in the course of their deliberations in any legal
proceedings.”
Within these terms, research with real jurors is still possible and a small number
of research projects have been undertaken in the UK context (although never in
Scotland)54 that have worked within the terms of the Act and surveyed jurors. The
Act does not rule out asking real jurors about aspects of their experience as jurors
other than what went on in the course of deliberations or about their understanding
of legal terms or concepts. So, for example, in a study undertaken in Northern
Ireland, jurors who had sat on trials in Belfast Crown Court were asked about
topics including their comprehension of the judge’s directions and the evidence
given by witnesses and whether they took notes or used other memory aids.55
Moreover, the Act does not rule out asking jurors some limited questions about
their deliberations, as illustrated by the survey of jurors undertaken for the Royal
Commission on Criminal Justice.56 Jurors in three Crown Courts in England were
asked to complete a questionnaire after having sat on criminal trials. This included
a number of questions about whether the individual juror felt that the jury as a
whole understood the evidence in the case, whether they remembered the evidence
when they retired to the jury room, whether they took notes during the trial, and
whether they followed the judge’s directions on the law.57 Jurors were also asked
“how long did the jury deliberate?”,58 a question which clearly relates to
deliberations, but which did not fall within the terms of the Act because it was not
about “statements made, opinions expressed, arguments advanced or votes cast”.
The questionnaire was vetted for compliance with the Contempt of Court Act by
the Attorney General, the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor’s
Department.59
The Act would not automatically rule out undertaking field experiments with
real juries either, although there are other reasons weighing against doing so. A
field experiment is a controlled experiment where some aspects of the experiment
are kept constant, while others are varied, so that the impact of a particular factor
can be measured. This has never, as far as we are aware, been done in the UK, but
in the US studies have been undertaken with real jurors using the field experiment
technique. Heuer and Penrod, for example, secured the co-operation of judges in
a mixture of criminal and civil trials in Wisconsin to test the impact of written
directions on juror recall and comprehension of legal concepts.60 In the study, 29
54Aside from a survey of persons cited for jury service, which was limited to questions on the process of jury
selection and the length of the court day. See E. Samuel and I. Clark, Improving Practice: A Summary of Responses
to the Consultation on the 2002 Review of the Practices and Procedure of the High Court of Justiciary (2003), pp.3–4
and annexes E–F.
55J. Jackson, “Juror Decision-Making and the Trial Process” in G. Davies et al. (eds), Psychology, Law and Criminal
Justice (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1996), pp.327, 328–331. Similar surveys of jurors have been undertaken in other
jurisdictions: see, e.g. M. Findlay, Jury Management in New South Wales (1994).
56M. Zander and P. Henderson, The Crown Court Study (Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Research Study
No.19, 1993). Zander was himself a member of the Royal Commission.
57M. Zander, “A Response to the Department of Constitutional Affairs’ Consultation Paper (CP 04/05)” (2005),
para.15.
58Zander, “A Response to the Department of Constitutional Affairs’ Consultation Paper (CP 04/05)” (2005),
para.15.
59Zander, “A Response to the Department of Constitutional Affairs’ Consultation Paper (CP 04/05)” (2005),
para.14.
60L. Heuer and S.D. Penrod, “Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment With Written and Preliminary Instructions”
(1989) 13 Law and Human Behavior 409. The same authors have also undertaken field experiments in other contexts,
such as the impact of allowing jurors to take notes and ask questions during criminal trials: see L. Heuer and S.D.
704 Criminal Law Review
[2016] Crim. L.R., Issue 10 © 2016 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited
judges randomly assigned their trials so that some juries received written
instructions and some did not. After the trial was over the jurors were asked to
complete questionnaires aimed at testing their recall and comprehension of the
instructions they received.61 The extent to which field experiments can be utilised
in real trials is, however, limited as the manipulation of any variables that might
affect the fairness of the trial would clearly be out of the question.62
The statutory protection of jury secrecy in the UK does mean that jury
deliberations could not be legitimately observed or recorded.63 To date, these
provisions have never been suspended in the UK jurisdictions to allow for such
research, but this has not prevented research that would be prohibited here being
undertaken in other jurisdictions, either because the same restrictions do not exist
or because they have been lifted to allow for research to take place. That said, the
recording or observing of deliberations in criminal trials has not to our knowledge
ever been undertaken, although it has in civil proceedings.64 The concern here
would be that the presence of researchers or a recording device might affect
behaviour and, possibly, the fairness of the accused’s trial.65 Jury members in other
jurisdictions have, however, been asked about various aspects of their deliberations.
Sandys and Dillehay,66 for example, asked jurors in the US about their first ballot
vote and how this changed following deliberation.67 Another research project, in
New South Wales, asked jurors about the impact media publicity had on
deliberations.68Here, legislative amendment was not required, because the relevant
legislation—the Jury Act 1977—contains a provision whereby permission can be
granted by the Attorney General for the conduct of a research project into matters
relating to juries or jury service.69 This provision also enabled a wider research
project to be undertaken in New South Wales, which surveyed jurors on multiple
issues, including a number of questions about deliberations, such as whether any
individual jurors changed their verdict during deliberations, whether all jurors felt
able to express their opinion freely, how the foreman was chosen and the factors
that influenced the jury’s decision.70
Perhaps the most extensive project that has involved—among other
things—asking jurors about their deliberations is that undertaken as part of the
Penrod, “Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of its Meaning and its Effects” (1994) 18 Law and Human Behavior
29.
61Heuer and Penrod, “Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment With Written and Preliminary Instructions” (1989)
13 Law and Human Behavior 409, 416.
62M. Chesterman, J. Chan and S. Hampton,Managing Prejudicial Publicity: An Empirical Study of Criminal Jury
Trials in New South Wales (2002), para.84.
63Although see G. Mungham and Z. Bankowski, “The Jury in the Legal System” (1975) 23 The Sociological
Review 202, where the researchers admit to agreeing that a student who was called for jury duty would illicitly record
the deliberations in shorthand.
64 See, e.g. S.S. Diamond et al., “Jury Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizonan Innovation” (2003)
45 University of Arizona L.R. 1.
65Diamond et al discuss (at 22–23) whether the camera made a difference to behaviour when they recorded
deliberations in a civil trial and concluded that it probably did not. Another option would be to record deliberations
without the knowledge of jurors but this is unlikely to receive ethical approval.
66M. Sandys and R. Dillehay, “First-Ballot Votes” (1995) 19 Law and Human Behavior 175.
67See similarly S.P. Garvey et al., “Juror First Votes in Criminal Trials” (2003) Cornell Law School Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Paper 3. See also N. Marder, “Juries, Justice, and Multiculturalism” (2002) 75 Southern
California Law Review 659, which asked US jurors about their deliberations in a different context.
68M. Chesterman, J. Chan and S. Hampton,Managing Prejudicial Publicity: An Empirical Study of Criminal Jury
Trials in New South Wales (2002).
69 See s.68A(3).
70M. Findlay, JuryManagement in New SouthWales (1994), App.2 (where a copy of the questionnaire is provided).
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New Zealand Law Commission’s project on juries in criminal trials.71 The
researchers in this project sampled 48 criminal trials over a period of nine months
in 1988 using a number of research methods, including interviews with jurors who
had sat on criminal trials.72 The interviews were semi-structured and addressed a
wide variety of issues, ranging from the adequacy and clarity of pre-trial
information and jurors’ reactions to the trial process, as well as the jury’s
decision-making process and the nature of and basis for the jury’s verdict.73 Some
of the questions relating to the last of these were highly specific, including how
deliberations were opened; their structure; how focussed the jury remained on the
issue; the use of previous conviction information; the role of the foreperson; whether
dominant jurors emerged; and themethods used for resolving any disagreements.74
Research with real jurors does have one key advantage, which is its realism—the
participants have sat on real trials in which they determined the fate of an accused
person. It does though have a number of possible drawbacks. It is always going
to require some time and effort on the part of the researchers to seek the permission
and co-operation of the courts involved,75 which may not be forthcoming, and in
the UK jurisdictions there is the additional complexity of it potentially requiring
a legislative amendment depending on the scope of the research enquiry. In addition,
some research questions—most of those that seek to test the impact of a single
factor on the outcome of the trial process—cannot be adequately answered by real
juror research, as the potential for controlled experiments is limited.
Research with real jurors also raises some practical questions. Assuming that
they cannot be directly observed, any information about deliberations obtained
from real jurors is reliant on accurate self-reporting.76 Problems may arise in terms
of an individual’s memory or perception of events or in terms of deliberate
misrepresentation, perhaps because the individual concerned does not want to
admit to any behaviour which presents him or her in a negative light.77 These can
be mitigated to a certain extent. Problems with deliberate misrepresentation can
be minimised—although not avoided entirely—by asking several jurors about the
same events.78 Problems with recall can be addressed by surveying jurors as soon
71W. Young, N. Cameron and Y. Tinsley, Juries In Criminal Trials Part Two: A Summary Of The Research
Findings (1999). The research informed the LawCommission’s reports: New Zealand LawCommission,Preliminary
Paper on Juries in Criminal Trials: Part I (1998), Law. Com. PP32 and New Zealand Law Commission, Discussion
Paper on Juries in Criminal Trials: Part II (1999), Law. Com. PP37.
72 Such research is not expressly prohibited in New Zealand, although it is necessary to obtain the consent of the
court: see Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand Ltd [1994] 1 N.Z.L.R. 48 at 58. For discussion, see J. Tunna,
“Contempt of Court: Divulging the Confidences of the Jury Room” (2003) 9 Canterbury Law Review 79, 106.
73New Zealand Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Juries in Criminal Trials: Part II (1999), Law. Com.
PP37, para.1.6.
74New Zealand Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Juries in Criminal Trials: Part II (1999), Law. Com.
PP37, Ch.6, especially paras.6.1, 6.7–6.17, 6.23, 6.34, 6.45.
75Although in terms at least of the time involved, this is likely to be far outweighed by the time involved in setting
up a realistic mock jury experiment.
76 S. Sommers and P. Ellsworth, “How Much Do We Really Know About Race and Juries? A Review of Social
Science Theory and Research” (2003) 78 Chicago-Kent Law Review 997, 1000–1001.
77R. Nisbett and T. DeCamp Wilson “Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes”
(1977) 84 Psychological Review 231; A. Greenwald andM. Banaji, “Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem,
and Stereotypes” (1995) 102 Psychological Review 4.
78 In the New Zealand research, an average of 6.5 of 12 jurors per trial were interviewed: see New Zealand Law
Commission, Discussion Paper on Juries in Criminal Trials: Part II (1999), Law. Com. PP37, para.1.7.
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as possible after the trial has concluded,79 ideally before they have left the court.80
Catching jurors before they leave court also means that if a questionnaire survey
is used response rates are likely to be higher than giving jurors questionnaires to
take away with them or sending questionnaires by post (or other methods such as
email). It has been suggested that surveying jurors immediately after their case
has concluded runs the risk of them racing to complete the questionnaire so that
they can return home,81 but this too might be mitigated by ensuring that any
interview or questionnaire is relatively short.82
Research with mock juries
The other broad option for undertaking jury research is to do so using mock jurors
or juries and this is the method that has been used by the vast majority of jury
studies undertaken in the UK jurisdictions—and indeed worldwide. Mock jury
research involves attempting to simulate the trial experience with recruited
participants acting as jurors. It does not generally require the permission of the
courts (although this will depend on how the mock jurors are recruited)83 and can
be undertaken within the terms of the Contempt of Court Act. It also has two key
advantages over research with real jurors, as it permits the manipulation of trial
variables while leaving other factors constant and it also allows for the observation
of “jury” deliberations rather than relying on self-reporting.
The one key disadvantage of mock jury research is that it can never replicate
the trial process with 100 per cent authenticity and, as such, its external
validity—the extent to which its findings are generalisable beyond the experimental
setting—is open to question.84 There are four main respects in which studies can
diverge from reality, for understandable reasons of convenience or cost. The first
is in terms of the study participants,85 with some studies using university students
as jurors rather than drawing participants from a more realistic pool. The second
is the extent to which the trial itself is accurately recreated,86 with some studies
relying on trial transcripts or study packs instead of video or trial re-enactment.
The third is in terms of including jury deliberation in the research design.87 While
79As the NewZealand researchers did—seeNewZealand LawCommission,Discussion Paper on Juries in Criminal
Trials: Part II (1999), Law. Com. PP37, para.1.6.
80See the discussion in J.D. Lieberman and B.D. Sales, “What Social Science Teaches us About the Jury Instruction
Process” (1997) 3 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 589, 626–628.
81 Findlay, Jury Management in New South Wales (1994), p.31, where he notes that jurors in his study became
competitive with each other, racing to finish the questionnaire first, meaning that some questions were missed out.
That said, Findlay stated that this was still his preferred method, due to the notoriously low response rates for postal
questionnaires.
82 In this context, it is worth noting that Findlay’s questionnaire was 11 pages long, and contained 104 numbered
questions, many of which contained subsets of questions or were open-ended.
83As discussed below (see text attached to fn. 91), some studies have recruited jurors from the pool of individuals
cited to court but not selected to sit on a jury. This would clearly require the permission of the court concerned.
84The classic discussion of the limitations of mock jury research is W. Weiten and S.S. Diamond, “A Critical
Review of the Jury Simulation Paradigm: The Case of Defendant Characteristics” (1979) 3 Law and Human Behavior
71. See also S.S. Diamond, “Illuminations and Shadows from Jury Simulations” (1997) 21 Law and Human Behavior
561.
85See W. Weiten and S.S. Diamond, “A Critical Review of the Jury Simulation Paradigm: The Case of Defendant
Characteristics” (1979) 3 Law and Human Behavior 71, 75.
86Weiten andDiamond, “ACritical Review of the Jury Simulation Paradigm: The Case of Defendant Characteristics”
(1979) 3 Law and Human Behavior 71, 77.
87Weiten andDiamond, “ACritical Review of the Jury Simulation Paradigm: The Case of Defendant Characteristics”
(1979) 3 Law and Human Behavior 71, 78.
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the extent to which the first two factors affect generalisibility is contested,88 there
is a broad consensus that studies that do not include an element of deliberation
always lack external validity.89 The fourth is in respect of participants’ awareness
that they are role playing and that their decision has no real life consequences.90
The extent to which studies are “realistic” in terms of the first three of these
issues varies enormously. Some studies have addressed the first issue by
undertaking research with mock jurors recruited from the pool of those cited to
court but who have not been selected to sit on a real case.91 The second issue can
be addressed by asking mock jurors to follow a real trial,92 although this rules out
conducting any type of controlled experiment. Other studies have addressed it by
creating relatively realistic trial simulations, using actors and/or criminal justice
professionals. The third issue can be addressed by including deliberation in the
research design, although the extent to which this truly recreates the deliberation
process varies, with most studies limiting the time that mock jurors spend in
“deliberations” or the size of the deliberating groups.93 The most realistic studies
attempt to address all three of these issues, with perhaps the best example of this
in the UK context being the research Cheryl Thomas carried out in England for
the Ministry of Justice,94 in which she tested the extent to which race influenced
jury decision making using jurors who were cited but not selected, a highly realistic
filmed trial in which legal professionals participated and deliberated in groups of
the same size as a legally valid jury.95
This shows that it is possible to undertake a relatively realistic mock jury study,
although the complexity, time and cost of doing so is likely to be substantial,
involving as it does the scripting, casting and filming of a full trial (or more than
one trial if factors within the trial are to be manipulated). The one issue that mock
jury studies can never adequately address,96 however, is the issue of real world
consequences and they will always be vulnerable to the criticism that participants
88Borstein has argued that they make little difference: see B.H. Bornstein, “The Ecological Validity of Jury
Simulations: Is the Jury Still Out?” (1999) 23 Law andHuman Behavior 75, 78 (student jurors) and 84 (trial transcripts).
Wiener et al disagree: see R.L. Wiener, D.A. Krauss and J.D. Lieberman, “Mock Jury Research: Where Do We Go
From Here?” (2011) 29 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 467, 472.
89See, e.g. N. Nuñez, S.M.McCrea and S.E. Culhane, “Jury DecisionMaking Research: Are Researchers Focusing
on theMouse and Not the Elephant in the Room?” (2011) 29 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 439. For an explanation
of why this might be the case, see F. Leverick, “Jury Instructions on Eyewitness Identification Evidence: A
Re-Evaluation” (2016) 49 Creighton L.R. 555, 566–567.
90Weiten andDiamond, “ACritical Review of the Jury Simulation Paradigm: The Case of Defendant Characteristics”
(1979) 3 Law and Human Behavior 71, 81.
91 See, e.g. Dann, Hans and Kaye, Testing the Effects of Selected Jury Trial Innovations on Juror Comprehension
of Contested mtDNA Evidence (2005), p.24; Thomas, Are Juries Fair? (2010), p.8.
92Sometimes termed “shadow jury” research: see, e.g. S. McCabe and R. Purves, The Shadow Jury at Work (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1974).
93 See, e.g. L. Ellison and V. Munro, “‘Telling Tales’: Exploring Narratives of Life and Law Within the (Mock)
Jury Room” (2015) 35 L.S. 201 where the researchers (for understandable reasons) in an otherwise extremely realistic
simulation used groups “with an average of eight members” (at 204) and limited deliberation time to 90 minutes (at
205).
94C. Thomas, Are Juries Fair? (2010).
95 See Thomas, Are Juries Fair? (2010), Ch.2 for a detailed account of Thomas’s research methods. For other
examples of highly realistic mock jury studies, see, e.g. Dann, Hans and Kaye, Testing the Effects of Selected Jury
Trial Innovations on Juror Comprehension of Contested mtDNA Evidence (2005); E. Finch and V. Munro, “Juror
Stereotypes and Blame Attribution in Rape Cases Involving Intoxication” (2005) 45 B.J. Crim. 25; S. Sommers, “On
Racial Diversity and Group Decision-Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury
Deliberations” (2006) 90 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 597; L. Ellison and V. Munro, “‘Telling
Tales’: Exploring Narratives of Life and Law Within the (Mock) Jury Room” (2015) 35 L.S. 201.
96 For a study that attempted to do so, see J. Lipton, “Racism in the Jury Box: The Hispanic Defendant” (1983) 5
Hispanic Journal of Behavioural Sciences 275 (although the study was very unrealistic in other respects).
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might not act in the same way if they held the fate of a real accused person in their
hands.
How might the PSCR’s research questions be addressed?
At the outset it should be said that there is no “perfect” method of undertaking
jury research. All of the different options have advantages and drawbacks and it
is not possible simultaneously to maximise realism and control—attention to one
necessarily weakens the other.97 Identifying an appropriate research method also
depends very much on the research question(s) being asked as some will be
answered most effectively by real jury research and others by mock jury research.
In terms of the questions identified by the PCSR (set out earlier in this paper),
there are some that are not research questions as such, but are matters for
consideration following the results of this research (and other relevant research
projects and discussions). In this category are Q6 (whether there are benefits in
requiring the jury to attempt to reach a unanimous verdict), Q7 (whether the same
majority should be required for acquittal as for conviction) and Q8 (whether the
votes for each verdict should be disclosed in court).
In terms of the choice of method for the remainder, there is one that could not
be addressed with real jury research, Q5 (the differences in outcome, assuming an
identical factual matrix, as between a 12 person jury with only two possible verdicts
and a 15 person jury with three verdicts, and the reasons for those differences).
This question lends itself to controlled experiments with juries of 12 and 15
persons,98 although the scale of the study—especially to research all possible
combinations using samples big enough to make the results meaningful—would
need to be extremely large.
Q4 (the extent to which the members of a jury of 15 as compared with a jury of
12 actually participate in deliberations) could not be addressed with research into
real Scottish juries alone, although research into the extent to which members of
15 person Scottish juries participate in deliberations might be compared with
research into 12 person juries elsewhere.99
While the other research questions might be answered by either real jury research
or mock jury research, the former has the advantage of being undertaken with real
jurors in the context of them sitting on a real trial and is also likely to be
substantially cheaper and less complex than undertaking a realistic mock jury
study.
Q1 (what jurors understand to be the difference between Not Guilty and Not
Proven) could be addressed by surveying real jurors after the conclusion of a
number of trials—they would not necessarily need to be trials in which the jury
97N.L. Kerr and R.M. Bray “Simulation, Realism, and the Study of the Jury” in N. Brewer and K.D. Williams
(eds), Psychology and Law: An Empirical Perspective (New York: Guilford Press, 2005), p.358; D.J. Devine at al.,
“Jury DecisionMaking: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups” (2001) 7 Psychology, Public Policy
and Law 622, 626.
98Although some limited insight might be gained by undertaking a programme of research with real 15 person
juries and comparing this with research on jury size elsewhere.
99Subject to the rather significant caveat that the research which exists in this area is limited in extent and concerned
with civil rather than criminal juries: see J. Kessler, “An Empirical Study of Six- and Twelve-Member Jury
Decision-Making Processes” (1973) 6 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 712. Answering this question
via mock jury research would pose a different set of challenges: as it is possible that participation in discussions may
vary with the nature of the case, any study would require a number of different trial simulations to be prepared in
addition for these simulations to be run before 12 and 15 person juries.
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actually returned a not proven verdict. Care would need to be taken here to avoid
the dangers of jurors over-estimating their own understanding. Simply asking
jurors whether they understood a particular legal term is insufficient on its own,
as is illustrated by Thomas’ research, in which 68 per cent of jurors claimed that
they had understood a jury instruction on self-defence but when assessed objectively
only 31 per cent actually had.100 Asking jurors to explain a term in their own words
(perhaps in addition to asking them to self-assess their understanding) is likely to
be more valuable.101 This question could also be researched with real jurors without
requiring legislative amendment, as it need not involve asking jurors about anything
that happened in the course of their deliberations.
Q2 (why the jury chose not proven over not guilty) and Q3 (why, and to what
extent, do jurors alter their position as regards not proven and not guilty as a result
of deliberations) could also be addressed by research with real jurors, although
here the research questions could only be addressed by surveys of jurors following
cases in which a not proven verdict was actually returned (or in relation to Q3
either of the two acquittal verdicts). Such cases cannot be predicted in advance,
so either a very large sample of trials would need to be included in the research in
order that sufficient not proven verdicts arose or questionnaires would need to be
administered only in those trials where the verdict was returned. Meaningful
research into these questions with real jurors would, however, require amending
the Contempt of Court Act 1981.
Analysis
Against this background, how should the Scottish Government proceed with a
programme of jury research? The breadth of the questions identified by the PCSR,
along with the possibility of significant legislative change following any research
programme, suggests that research with real jurors would be preferable to mock
jury research. A programme of mock jury research addressing all these questions,
designed in as realistic a fashion as possible, would be extremely expensive and
time-consuming. However well-designed the project, the results would be open
to challenge as lacking external validity, which would make it difficult for the
government to persuade the Scottish Parliament of the case for any legislative
change which was felt necessary following the research. Suppose, for example,
that the results of mock jury research supported the hypothesis that jurors did not
understand the not proven verdict, and the Scottish Government proposed to remove
the verdict as a result. If those defending the verdict objected that the research
could not be relied upon because mock jurors may not have taken the process as
seriously as real ones, or that a simulated trial process without consequence would
not have focused the minds of jurors appropriately, it would be difficult if not
impossible for the government convincingly to rebut these arguments. Any other
proposals for legislative change, if based only on mock jury research, would be
vulnerable to similar objections.
100C. Thomas, Are Juries Fair? (2010), p.36.
101 See Lieberman and Sales, “What Social Science Teaches us About the Jury Instruction Process” (1997) 3
Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 589, 593–595 where the authors run through the advantages and disadvantages
of a number of different methods of assessing juror comprehension of terminology.
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In addition, it should be noted that the research questions proposed by the PCSR
do not—with one exception—involve attempts to test the effect of a particular
change to the jury system. Where that is proposed, mock jury simulations allow
the researchers to undertake a controlled experiment, holding as many variables
as possible constant and thus testing the effect of making a single systemic
alteration. The PCSR’s questions are instead focused on obtaining a broad range
of information about the system as it presently operates, again suggesting that
research with real jurors would be preferable to using mock juries.
The exception is Q5 (differences in outcome between differently constituted
juries with identical factual matrices), which could not be addressed with real
juries. Here, there are two options. First, this question could be addressed by a
distinct programme of research involving controlled case simulations. The second
option would be for the government to consider omitting this question from the
programme of research altogether. While any research which adds to our stock of
knowledge about jury decision-making is in principle valuable, the gains from this
programme of research are likely to be marginal at best and come at significant
cost given the scale of the research project required. At best, such research would
tell us that juries constituted in a particular fashion were more or less likely (and
to what extent) to convict than juries constituted in another fashion. But that is all.
The research could not identify the “correct” level of propensity to convict in
respect of any of the factual matrices used for the purposes of the research. If a
sufficient variety of factual matrices were developed, we might discover that these
differences were more pronounced in respect of some crimes than others—but
again, while any such conclusions would be of interest, it is unclear how they could
provide a basis for any legislative proposals (or a case for the status quo).
Although research with real jurors would be the preferable mode of inquiry,
section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 does present a barrier to carrying out
this research.102 The legislative change required to permit such research, however,
would be relatively straightforward.103 A potential model is s.68A(3) of the Jury
Act 1977 in New South Wales, which provides simply that the prohibition on
soliciting information from jurors
“does not prohibit a person from soliciting information from a juror or former
juror in accordance with an authority granted by the Attorney General for the
conduct of a research project into matters relating to juries or jury service”.104
While any proposal to amend s.8 is likely (rightly) to attract critical scrutiny
from the legal profession, judiciary and the Scottish Parliament, it should be
possible to assuage concerns by pointing to the extensive body of research with
102Cf. C. Thomas, “Exposing the Myth of Jury Research” Criminal Law & Justice Weekly, 9 December 2014,
arguing that it is a myth that s.8 prevents jury research. We agree entirely: our argument here is only that the questions
identified by the PCSR are best answered via research which involves the amendment of s.8, not that jury research
is rendered impossible by that provision.
103There is, of course, a broader debate regarding jury secrecy (see Department for Constitutional Affairs, Jury
Research and Impropriety (Consultation Paper CP 04/05, 2005)). For reasons of space, we cannot enter into that
debate more fully here: it is sufficient for our purposes to note that a number of questions have been identified by the
PCSR as meriting inquiry, and that if such inquiry is meaningfully to be carried out, amendment of s.8 will be required.
104An amendment to the 1981 Act would require to be worded slightly differently, as the prohibition in s.8 applies
not only to soliciting but also to disclosing and obtaining. One approach would be to insert a new para.(c) into subs.8(2)
of the Act (which lists other disclosures to which the prohibition does not apply) reading “in the course of a research
project into matters relating to juries or jury service carried out in accordance with an authority granted by the Lord
Advocate [or the Lord Advocate and the Lord Justice General]”.
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real jurors that has been carried out in comparable jurisdictions without apparent
difficulty and the safeguard of the research requiring official approval (in Scotland,
most likely either that of the Lord Advocate or Lord Justice General, or both
jointly).105 One of the most compelling arguments against any relaxation of jury
secrecy rules for the purposes of research is that such research may simply be
unnecessary given the vast body of research into the operation of the jury which
already exists worldwide,106 but the peculiarities of the Scottish system mean that
this argument has little purchase here.
In addition to the general safeguard of approval being required for any research
project, it should be possible to build a series of safeguards into the project itself.
The most obvious model is the project carried out for the New Zealand Law
Commission, which required in each case the consent of the presiding judge to
jury research, had an Advisory Committee with judicial representation with the
right to veto proposed methodology or questioning, and took a series of measures
to ensure that data was recorded and held anonymously and non-identifiably.107
If the Scottish Government (or the Parliament) is unwilling to amend the 1981
Act, it would still be possible to carry out research with real jurors. This would,
however, mean accepting that the questions identified by the PCSR could not be
addressed in full, and some could not be meaningfully addressed at all. Similar
safeguards to those already mentioned could be adopted, with the addition of very
clear warnings to jurors not to breach the terms of s.8.108
Conclusion
Given the lack of jury research in Scotland to date, the Scottish Government’s
decision to commission jury research provides an unprecedented opportunity. We
have argued in this paper that the research questions identified by the
Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review would best be investigated through a
programme of research with real jurors rather than mock jurors. In respect of the
single research question identified by the Review which cannot be addressed
through real jury research, the Scottish Government should consider either a
separate focused programme of mock jury research or choosing not to proceed
with research into that question. A properly designed and executed research study109
will allow scholars to learn more about the operation of a jury system which is
both significantly distinct from the remainder of the common law world and
105The survey noted in E. Samuel and I. Clark, Improving Practice: A Summary of Responses to the Consultation
on the 2002 Review of the Practices and Procedure of the High Court of Justiciary (2003) was done with the approval
of the Lord Justice General.
106Auld LJ, Report of the Review of the Criminal Courts (2001), p.168.
107These are set out in New Zealand Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Juries in Criminal Trials: Part II
(1999), Law. Com. PP37, p.x.
108As was done in M. Zander and P. Henderson, The Crown Court Study (1993). See M. Zander, “Jury Research
and Impropriety: A Response to the Department of Constitutional Affairs’ Consultation Paper (CP 04/05)” (2005),
para.14. Cf. K. Warner et al., Jury Sentencing Survey (2010), p.2, noting that an exemption was granted under s.58
of the Juries Act 2003 (Tasmania) for the purposes of that research, because of the risk of jurors spontaneously
commenting on deliberations even though they were not being asked about this.
109We have not sought to sketch out the methodology which should be employed, but it will be clear that there is
an extensive body of work on which to draw in this respect. We would draw attention to the practical questions which
we noted above (text attached to fnn.76–82) and note the importance of a pilot study and perhaps, if the questionnaire
method is employed, the advantages of a series of interlinked projects employing different questionnaires rather than
attempting to administer a single excessively long questionnaire to all jurors involved in the research.
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under-researched, and should be of considerable interest both within the Scottish
criminal justice system and elsewhere.
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